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INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
In the December of 1989, the United States launched Operation Just Cause, a military 
invasion of the country of Panama, capturing Manuel Noriega and overthrowing his 
government.1 This research project has examined how Colin Powell, Richard Cheney, James 
Baker, and George H. W. Bush presented Operation Just Cause in their memoirs. It has 
attempted to determine how these senior leaders’ depictions of this invasion incorporated it into 
the Bush administration’s overall foreign-policy strategy, and the research has found that their 
general approach was to present the Panama intervention as an isolated incident which had no 
intentional link to other major events at the time, was not made for strategic or political gain, and 
was driven entirely or almost entirely by idealist reasons. These former leaders accomplished this 
by neglecting to connect the Panama intervention with the decline of Soviet power, painting the 
media as an antagonistic force which hindered the invasion rather than helped the 
administration’s standing, connecting the intervention to the Gulf War in incidental or only 
minor ways, frequently holding each other responsible for the decision to invade instead of 
taking responsibility themselves, and justifying it by appealing to democracy and self-defense. 
Operation Just Cause was not the first time that Panama found itself involved with the 
United States. The small country had already gone through a long history of being entangled in 
American foreign policy. In 1898, the United States declared war on Spain. This conflict had 
been precipitated by sympathy for Spanish-occupied Cuba and the explosion of the Maine, an 
American battleship which had been stationed in Havana’s harbor. The Spanish-American War 
was a clear victory for the United States, which decisively defeated Spain in a relatively short 
                                                           
1 John Robert Greene, “Bush, George,” in The Encyclopedia of American Political 
History, ed. Paul Finkelman and Peter Wallenstein (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2001), 36. 
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amount of time and with relatively low losses of its own. In the wake of the conflict, 
expansionists within the United States triumphed; Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines came 
under American control. Meanwhile, the United States gained the rights to build a naval base in 
the newly-independent Cuba. These new land holdings increased the international influence of 
the United States and set the stage for further ventures in Latin America.2 
Earlier, in 1870, the United States had hoped to build and utilize a canal in Panama. 
However, talks with Colombia, which controlled Panama, proved unsuccessful.3 The United 
States was forced to seriously revisit the idea of a canal in Panama after its war with Spain. As a 
direct consequence of its victory in the Spanish-American War, America was left with territory 
in the Atlantic as well as the Pacific. Creating a passageway which could bridge these two 
oceans suddenly became a matter of great military importance.4 
Though the Senate granted President Theodore Roosevelt authorization to make a deal 
with the Colombian government and obtain the land necessary for a canal, the Colombians 
refused the offer presented to them. Threats were equally ineffective.5 In response to this lack of 
cooperation on the part of the Colombian government, President Roosevelt, who had played a 
major role in planning the Spanish-American War before resigning from his government post to 
fight the Spanish in Cuba, backed a Panamanian revolution against Colombia. With Colombia’s 
                                                           
2 April L. Brown, “Spanish-American War,” in The Encyclopedia of American Political 
History, ed. Paul Finkelman and Peter Wallenstein (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2001), 361-363. 
3 Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 22. 
4 Ibid., 24-26. 
5 Ibid., 28-29. 
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rule over, the now-independent country of Panama leased the necessary land to the United States 
and construction of the canal began.6 
Staking out an aggressive position on foreign policy issues, President Theodore 
Roosevelt had been a strong advocate for United States intervention in Latin America.7 In 1904, 
when Panama nearly fell victim to a military coup, Theodore Roosevelt deployed U.S. Marines 
to end the crisis. In 1908, American troops were present in Panama to oversee the country’s 
elections. Throughout the early twentieth century, United States military interventions in Panama 
continued, and a long-term presence of United States military personnel within the county took 
root. Meanwhile, the Panamanian economy became heavily reliant on banks based in the United 
States.8 
President Herbert Hoover’s Good Neighbor Policy, declared in 1928, promised a pivot 
away from the interventionist policies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. However, 
such promises had little effect on how the United States treated Panama. Though less public and 
more secretive about doing so, the United States government continued to interfere in the 
political affairs of Panamanians. When Arnulfo Arias led a populist coup in 1931, his success 
was only allowed to occur because Washington was confident that he would not act against the 
interests of the United States. This approach of public friendliness was continued under President 
Franklin Roosevelt, largely for the purpose of undercutting Germany and Japan, which were 
seeking influence in Panama. Yet, despite some concessions to Panama under Franklin 
Roosevelt, the country’s efforts to become economically independent failed and the country’s 
                                                           
6 Sabra Bissette Ledent, “Roosevelt, Theodore,” in The Encyclopedia of American 
Political History, ed. Paul Finkelman and Peter Wallenstein (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2001), 333-
334. 
7 Ibid., 334. 
8 Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 38-39. 
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canal remained in American hands. When Arnulfo Arias was elected Panama’s president in 
1938, the United States became concerned by his nationalistic ideas and pro-Nazi sympathies; 
the 1941 coup which overthrew him had American support. The new government aligned with 
the United States in World War II and facilitated a greater United States military presence.9 
Despite the contentious history between the United States and Panama, the Cold War 
brought the two countries closer together. Panama’s National Guard received American training 
and financial support as part of America’s overall strategy of fortifying Latin American countries 
against the communist threat. Panama, with its canal and its strategic location, was of particular 
value to United States policy-makers.10 In an attempt to steer Panama’s people away from 
revolutionary communism, President Kennedy dramatically boosted financial support being sent 
to Panama. Much of this money went directly to the county’s military. The year 1963 saw the 
establishment of the School of the Americas, a school in the Canal Zone of the country which 
existed for the purpose of training officers of Latin American armies in anti-communist 
methods.11 Panama was quickly becoming a centerpiece in America’s grand strategy to combat 
global communism. 
In 1969, a Panamanian Lieutenant Colonel by the name of Omar Torrijos emerged as the 
country’s new leader after yet another coup. Though reportedly forced by gunpoint to join in the 
military takeover, Torrijos quickly took power for himself and assured his regime’s safety by 
threatening to attack the Canal Zone if the United States attempted to depose him.12 Under his 
rule, the office of president became purely symbolic; Torrijos himself made the decisions. 
                                                           
9 Ibid., 39-42. 
10 Ibid., 50. 
11 Ibid., 56-57. 
12 Ibid., 66-67. 
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Defying the United States, Torrijos cultivated relationships with Fidel Castro and Momar 
Qadhafi.13 He even allowed communists to hold positions in his cabinet.14 
It was under Torrijos that the country’s canal would begin its movement away from 
United States ownership. When President Carter took office, he pursued a course of policy which 
was broadly based on a governing philosophy emphasizing human rights. Such an approach to 
issues led his administration to conduct actions in Latin America which many would consider 
radical.15 In 1978, the Senate approved Carter’s treaties, setting the Panama Canal to come under 
Panamanian control at the end of the century.16 Carter meant for these treaties to appease the 
rulers and people of Panama, reducing the likelihood of the Torrijos regime attempting to take 
the Canal Zone by force.17 But these two men would not be in office much longer. Torrijos died 
in 1981, when his airplane crashed into a mountain, providing an opportunity for Manuel 
Noriega to take power.18 The previous year, Carter’s administration was brought down by high 
inflation, persistent unemployment, and a hostage crisis abroad; Ronald Reagan was elected 
president.19 
Noriega had grown up poor in one of Panama’s slums. However, his brother was able to 
secure him a scholarship to attend a military academy in Peru. Afterwards, he continued his 
training under the United States military at Fort Bragg and the School of the Americans. He 
                                                           
13 Ibid., 69. 
14 Ibid., 71. 
15 Peter B. Levy, Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 
1996), 229. 
16 Sabra Bissette Ledent, “Carter, Jimmy,” in The Encyclopedia of American Political 
History, ed. Paul Finkelman and Peter Wallenstein (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2001), 52. 
17 Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 79-80. 
18 Ibid., 87. 
19 Peter B. Levy, Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 
1996), 130-131. 
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became an informant for the CIA and continued in that capacity while chief of intelligence under 
Omar Torrijos. After Torrijos died, Noriega remained a high-ranking military officer and, when 
Paredes, who had become head of the military, stepped down from that post to run for president, 
Noriega took charge of the military.20 By utilizing this position, “Noriega ruled Panama from 
behind the scenes from 1981 through 1989.”21 
The degree to which Manuel Noriega built up and cultivated Panama’s military is worth 
noting. Having successfully “promoted himself to the rank of general,” Noriega quickly 
“renamed the National Guard the Panamanian Defense Forces,” as well as “tripled its size.”22 
Noriega’s military force was indisputably better-equipped, more professionalized, and 
significantly larger than it had been two decades ago, giving his regime something of a deterrent 
against foreign powers. The strongman made his PDF flourish, and the bulk of its officers would 
remain loyal to him, even during difficult times.23 
The Reagan administration used Noriega as a tool in pursuit of its foreign-policy goals. 
Whereas Carter had acted based on a humanitarian agenda, Reagan was concerned with fighting 
communism. To this end, he supported the government of El Salvador, backed the contras in 
Nicaragua, and invaded Grenada.24 By the time President Reagan took office, the dependence of 
the United States on the Panama Canal had diminished greatly; a navy which was always present 
in both the Atlantic and Pacific, better ground transportation, and the development of nuclear 
                                                           
20 Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 91-93 
21 Alexander Kazan, Amy McKee, and Maryellen McQuade, “Panama,” in Encyclopedia 
of Latin American Politics, ed. Diana Kapiszewski and Alexander Kazan (Westport, CT: Oryx, 
2002), 241. 
22 Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 93. 
23 Ibid., 106. 
24 Peter B. Levy, Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 
1996), 229-230. 
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missiles reduced both its commercial and military importance.25 Regardless, Noriega profited 
politically when he enacted legislation which gave Panama’s military force a responsibility to 
protect the Panama Canal against communists. Despite the canal’s reduced usefulness, this 
gesture appears to have worked. The United States provided Noriega’s military with various 
armaments, including tanks.26 
Reagan’s administration came to form a symbiotic relationship with Noriega. The 
dictator’s background, having attended the School of the Americas and worked with the CIA, 
may have contributed to the ease with which he gained the trust of the Reagan administration and 
several of America’s federal agencies. He allowed the United States and the contras to use 
Panamanian land in the campaign against Central American communism. He also permitted the 
American military to keep its headquarters for Latin America in his country, even though its 
existence in Panama was technically violating treaties between the two countries. Panama was 
again becoming a key piece in America’s anti-communist strategy. His considerable assistance, 
especially in arming and training the anti-communist contras, led Reagan’s administration to 
overlook his drug-trafficking activities. Furthermore, the United States provided funds for 
Noriega’s preferred presidential candidate in Panama’s 1984 presidential election. After the race 
became too close and Noriega opted to steal it for his candidate, the American government 
praised the election and sent Secretary of State Schultz to the subsequent inauguration.27 
Relations between the United States and the Manuel Noriega regime, however, became 
strained due to a string of abuses perpetrated by the dictator. A Panamanian named Hugo 
Spadafora attempted to raise awareness of Noriega’s participation in the drug trade. He was 
                                                           
25 Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 90. 
26 Ibid., 93. 
27 Ibid., 93-98. 
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arrested by one of Noriega’s intelligence agents, and his decapitated corpse was found shortly 
thereafter. This set off a scandal which led to Panama’s president resigning from office and 
resulted in the United States government cutting economic aid to Panama down to a fraction of 
what it had been. Still, at least some in Washington saw the strongman as useful in the effort to 
arm the contras against the Sandinistas.28 Then, in 1986, Congress reauthorized the sending of 
aid to the contras; with such aid now legal and openly carried out, Noriega’s services in support 
of the contras were no longer necessary. Any protection from Washington which he may have 
still had evaporated when he became implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal and his “drug 
connections” became publicly known.29 
America’s relationship with Noriega quickly turned even more sour. The dictator 
worsened his situation by responding to unrest within his country by imposing what was 
effectively marshal law and assaulting protestors. In response to such actions, the United States 
Senate called for him to step down. The American government withdrew all of its military aid 
and worked through several avenues to punish Noriega economically. By the time 1987 reached 
its end, the Panamanian economy had been crippled to a severe extent. Noriega began reaching 
out to the Soviet Union and Libya.30 
From here, events in Panama moved rapidly towards their conclusion. Noriega’s military 
escalated its harassment of American servicemembers, and, in the December of 1988, Bush made 
a dramatic declaration: “Noriega must go.”31 Another blatant perpetration of electoral fraud by 
Noriega led Jimmy Carter to publicly condemn his regime and prompted his fellow Latin 
                                                           
28 Ibid., 98-100. 
29 Ibid., 102. 
30 Ibid., 104-107. 
31 Ibid., 110. 
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Americans to give up on supporting him. Caught between the goal of promoting democracy and 
the belief that Panama should handle its problems without intervention from abroad, the 
Organization of American States was paralyzed. President Bush suggested that Panamanians 
overthrown their dictator, but when Giroldi, one of Noriega’s officers, attempted to do so, the 
United States responded in an indecisive and convoluted way. Without American support, this 
haphazard coup failed; the conspirators were killed. As Americans residing in Panama continued 
to live in fear, American tanks and helicopters began arriving at United States bases within the 
country.32 
This crisis reached its climax in the December of 1989. The puppet-legislature of 
Noriega’s regime named him “chief executive officer of the government”; he then made the 
declaration that Panama and the United States were in a “state of war.”33 The next day, 
December 16, 1989, two violent events occurred. A U.S. Marine was shot and killed at one of 
Panama’s military checkpoints, and an American Navy lieutenant was arrested and beaten, along 
with his wife. President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama the next day.34 In doing so, he 
acted without consulting Congress.35 On December 20, 1989, American forces arrived in 
Panama, joining with the troops who had already been stationed there. Panama City was captured 
within seventy-two hours. Manuel Noriega fled to the Vatican embassy, which protected him 
until January 3, 1990. On that day, Noriega surrendered and was subsequently extradited to the 
United States, where he faced charges for his role in the drug trade. He was convicted in the 
                                                           
32 Ibid., 112-114. 
33 Ibid., 114. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Carol Jackson Adams, “War Powers,” in The Encyclopedia of American Political 
History, ed. Paul Finkelman and Peter Wallenstein (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2001), 433. 
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April of 1992 and sentenced to federal prison.36 American forces “remained in Panama briefly,” 
so that they could prevent any potential uprisings and “oversee the transfer of power to 
Endara.”37 
At the time, there was no clear consensus on whether or not the Panama intervention was 
justified. By the December of 1989, Americans had come to see Noriega as brutal and abusive 
towards those whom he ruled over, due to the dictator’s cruel actions.38 This negative overall 
perception of Noriega made the Bush administration’s intervention popular within the United 
States.39 While polls initially showed a high rate of support for this action among Americans, 
such positive sentiments eventually faded. This was likely because of the critics who pointed out 
that Noriega had previously been supported by the United States, meaning that the American 
government played a role in his rise. Other Latin American countries called the intervention an 
illegal violation of Panama’s sovereignty.40 The operation even caused the United States to be 
censured by the Organization of American States.41 However, a post-intervention poll by CBS 
News indicated “that 80 percent of Panamanians—even those who had lost their homes or 
relatives—approved of the invasion.”42 
                                                           
36 Peter B. Levy, Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 
1996), 273-275. 
37 Alexander Kazan, Amy McKee, and Maryellen McQuade, “Panama,” in Encyclopedia 
of Latin American Politics, ed. Diana Kapiszewski and Alexander Kazan (Westport, CT: Oryx, 
2002), 244. 
38 Peter B. Levy, Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 
1996), 274. 
39 Carol Jackson Adams, “War Powers,” in The Encyclopedia of American Political 
History, ed. Paul Finkelman and Peter Wallenstein (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2001), 433. 
40 Peter B. Levy, Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 
1996), 274-275. 
41 Ibid., 231. 
42 Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 116-
117. 
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The Panama intervention has, so far, been framed with a historical context provided by 
tertiary sources. Now, it is time to turn to a review of the secondary-source literature related to 
this operation. Such literature is important, since it provides one with useful perspectives from a 
variety of writers. The secondary sources included here touch on the role which the fall of 
communism played in encouraging the invasion, the role which the media played in covering the 
invasion, ways in which the operation influenced the subsequent Gulf War, the meetings which 
directly preceded and led to the decision to invade, and arguments over the degree to which the 
Panama intervention was justified. 
Eytan Gilboa’s “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post 
Cold War Era,” explains that this intervention “was the first American use of force since 1945 
that was unrelated to the cold war,” as well as “the first large-scale use of American troops 
abroad since Vietnam.”43 The United States had intervened in Latin America on many occasions 
to combat “perceived communists threats,” but “Noriega was not a communist.”44 This piece 
claims that Bush’s decision to intervene was brought about by two concurrent developments. The 
first of these was Noriega’s behavior, particularly his repeated harassment of Americans in 
Panama. The strongman’s appointment by the Panamanian National Assembly to “chief of the 
government,” as well as this assembly’s declaration of war against the United States, were 
followed by an escalation in this harassment and multiple cases of explicit violence against 
Americans.45 The second development was the Soviet Union’s collapse, which was becoming 
                                                           
43 Eytan Gilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the 
Post Cold War Era,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (Winter, 1995-1996): 539, accessed 
November 25, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151883. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 558. 
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increasingly apparent; it “was already disintegrating.”46 These events created an image of 
President Bush and his country as weak, at a time when people were looking to the United States 
“to become the sole remaining superpower.”47 Bush’s ability to handle the Noriega crisis in 
Panama became a test of his “ability to conduct the war on drugs, to promote democracy in Latin 
America, and to lead world affairs.48 This article claims that Bush wanted to deal with Noriega 
by ordering “a limited snatching operation,” but Powell convinced him that their chances of 
getting Noriega and establishing Panamanian democracy would be higher if they demolished the 
dictator’s military forces and his whole regime.49 
Wassim Daghrir’s article, “The Media and Operation Just Cause in Panama,” argues that 
the media backed the operation and provided Bush with political profit. Instead of reporting on 
all of the factors which led the United States government to oppose Noriega, “the US press 
focused only on the official explanations,” particularly his “involvement with narcotics trade and 
his lack of respect for democratic rule.”50 While “some commentators questioned the 
administration’s motives,” such “critical coverage was rather sporadic.”51 Similarly, the media 
accepted the Bush administration’s claim that American lives were in danger without 
scrutinizing this assertion or investigating the evidence offered in support of it. Daghrir goes as 
far as to say that media outlets protected the government’s explanations by largely excluding 
“US opponents to the invasion” from the mainstream debate.52 Meanwhile, objections to the 
                                                           
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 558-559. 
50 Wassim Daghrir, “The Media and Operation Just Cause in Panama,” Journal of Arts & 
Humanities 5, no. 5 (2016): 52, accessed November 25, 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.18533/journal.v5i5.942. 
51 Ibid., 53. 
52 Ibid., 53-54. 
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intervention from other countries were either downplayed or presented as irrational. The 
American media “issued positive assessments of the Panama invasion” while praising President 
Bush’s decision-making and legitimizing his actions.53 If Bush had been seeking to demonstrate 
his resolve and capabilities as a leader, he appears to have accomplished that goal. 
“Paving the Way for Baghdad: The US Invasion of Panama, 1989,” by Brian 
D’Haeseleer, explains the degree to which members of the Bush administration learned from the 
invasion of Panama and applied these lessons during the Gulf War. The invasion’s dramatic 
success convinced Powell that American military power, properly utilized, could quickly defeat 
an opposing force. By Powell’s own testimony, the Army used the same methods which enabled 
its success in Panama again during the Gulf War. He also used the same techniques to smoothly 
handle the media during both of these conflicts. In both military and media matters, Powell noted 
what worked during the intervention into Panama and directly applied these lessons to the 
subsequent war with Iraq. Cheney, similarly, came to see Operation Just Cause as a valuable 
learning experience which prepared the administration for the Gulf War. In particular, the 
invasion allowed him to practice keeping control over the media and making sure that the public 
was receiving the sorts of messages which the administration wanted them to. He was able to 
effectively repeat this management of the media during the Gulf War.54 
Several books provide accounts of the decision-making process behind the invasion and 
the operation’s implications from the perspective of the administration. George Bush: The Life of 
a Lone Star Yankee presents all of this in terms which are generally positive. According to this 
                                                           
53 Ibid., 55. 
54 Brian D’Haeseleer, “Paving the Way for Baghdad: The US Invasion of Panama, 1989,” 
The International History Review (June 2018): 10-11, accessed December 3, 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1480512. 
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telling of the story, while many incidents of violence moved President Bush closer to ordering 
the intervention, the case of an officer’s wife being sexually assaulted by the PDF “was the last 
straw.”55 It goes on to portray the ousting of Noriega as popular with Panamanians and very 
popular with Americans, even if the United Nations and Organization of American States 
condemned it. In addition to bringing democracy to Panama, it created an image of Bush as a 
strong and decisive leader.56 Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert 
Walker Bush provides a similar account. This version of the story presents the killing of “a 
young American marine,” as well as the harassment of “a navy lieutenant and his wife” as what 
prompted the invasion, but it does not single out any occurrence as the prime cause for his 
decision.57 It claims that the invasion of Panama showed that President Bush could carry out 
“effective military action.”58 
Another book, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, offers a different account 
of the prelude to the invasion. It assigns greater responsibility for the decision to launch the 
operation to Powell and offers an explanation of his motives. While mentioning that “Bush was 
visibly upset” by the violence perpetrated against Americans, it does so only briefly before 
pivoting to Powell’s perspective.59 It claims that Powell, who had once considered Panama to be 
“of secondary importance,” saw that “The Soviet bloc was crumbling” and decided to take action 
in Panama in order to demonstrate America’s capabilities as a superpower.60 In this telling of the 
                                                           
55 Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 
1997), 416. 
56 Ibid., 419. 
57 Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker 
Bush (New York: Random House, 2016), 388. 
58 Ibid., 389. 
59 Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The 
Storming of Panama (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 96. 
60 Ibid. 
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story, it was “Powell and his military advisers” who first concluded that an invasion was called 
for; Powell went on to convince Cheney at one meeting and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at another.61 
Then, despite doubts raised by Scowcroft and Bush’s concerns about the consequent casualties 
which could result “among American soldiers and Panamanian civilians,” Powell was able to 
convince the president and the other officials present at the final meeting that the military both 
could and should topple Noriega’s regime through the use of overwhelming force.62 However, 
the book does note the many reasons that Bush was sympathetic to the idea of an invasion. Bush 
considered Noriega to be “his longtime nemesis,” he wanted to bring Endara into power as the 
head of a democratic government, he was receiving “intelligence reports” which depicted 
“Noriega as increasingly desperate and paranoid,” and it was appearing that the strongman could 
no longer keep his followers under control.63 
“The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama under International Law,” by 
Ved P. Nanda, analyzes the intervention from a legal perspective. While Secretary of State Baker 
had argued for the invasion’s legality by presenting it as an act of self-defense, “Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter” broadly opposed such actions and “Article 18 of the OAS Charter” directly held 
such actions to be illegitimate.64 Though there was a “tense situation” in Panama, this article 
firmly argues that there was not sufficient danger for Americans or harm being inflicted on them 
to warrant “a full-scale invasion.”65 The intervention, therefore, “was in disregard of the 
pertinent norms and principles of international law,” and, regardless of the “political objectives 
                                                           
61 Ibid., 97-98. 
62 Ibid., 99. 
63 Ibid., 98-99. 
64 Ved P. Nanda, “The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under 
International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 84, no. 2 (April 1990): 494-495, 
accessed November 27, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2203462. 
65 Ibid., 497. 
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President Bush might have achieved,” this piece claims that his choice to invade was detrimental 
to the “long-term interests of the United States.”66Anthony D’Amato, in “The Invasion of 
Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny” argues against the position taken by Nanda. To 
him, the intervention was justified for having freed the Panamanian people “from oppression by 
a gang of ruling thugs.”67 D’Amato compares Noriega to an abusive husband. The strongman 
and those loyal to him had access to weapons, and he used his power to suppress dissenters with 
“imprisonment and disappearance.”68 Since Noriega held so much power and treated his own 
people with such brutality, this piece argues, it was “not only legally justified but morally 
required” for someone to intervene and put a stop to him.69 It concludes by claiming that 
America’s interventions to topple tyrannical regimes have “undoubtedly shaken” other 
oppressive rulers and “may very well act as catalysts” for global change.70 
This research project has set itself apart from the secondary literature on Operation Just 
Cause by focusing more closely on the writings which have been produced by those who were 
top-ranking officials in positions related to foreign policy at the time of the invasion. Their 
memoirs and other published personal writings serve as the primary documents which this paper 
has been built on. These sources have been examined to see what they wrote about the Panama 
intervention, as well as what they wrote about things which were closely connected to the 
intervention. 
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In interpreting these texts, this project has utilized the perspective of cultural history. The 
discipline of history has defined culture in multiple ways. This paper will examine culture in the 
broadest sense of the term, meaning the interconnected web of attitudes, experiences, values, and 
concepts which define human life.71 This definition of culture, leading to a focusing on 
perspectives, has made the practice of cultural history heavily tied into the field of 
anthropology.72 
The nature of the research done has made this paper into a work of “microhistory”; a kind 
of writing favored by historians who have drawn inspiration from anthropology, a microhistory 
focuses intensely on a small group of people who were involved in a particular event and places 
them “under minute scrutiny.”73 Any historical project which uses the anthropology-inspired 
approach must exercise caution. With a limited number of sources, which often have flaws, it is 
easy to make leaps in reasoning and begin to go beyond one’s facts.74 Still, a certain level of 
interpretation and some warranted inferences are necessary when trying to glean insights from 
memoirs, which tend to be dominated by the voices and assumptions of their authors. At times, it 
is necessary to read “against the grain,” attempting to see what has been omitted or left unsaid.75 
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THE DECLINE OF SOVIET POWER AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
It would be careless to write about or consider American foreign policy during this period 
without keeping the Cold War in mind. The international political situation was clearly changing, 
according to these memoirs. However, their descriptions of these major changes give the clear 
impression that there was no causal connection linking the fading of the Soviet threat and the 
Panama intervention. Rather, these memoirs portray the end of the Cold War as essentially 
pointing toward peace, with minimal points to the contrary. 
In 1962, Colin Powell saw a “neatness and simplicity” in the conflict with global 
communism and was eager to serve in Vietnam.76 Such a Cold War perspective was the 
foundation of American strategy and planning. However, Mikhail Gorbachev, upon becoming 
the leader of the Soviet Union, directed his attention away from fighting foreign wars and 
supporting communist regimes abroad, opting to direct his resources toward domestic affairs 
instead.77 Hearing from Gorbachev in person, Powell came to understand his position as one of 
“ending the Cold War” and ceasing to be an enemy of the United States.78 Shortly before 
Giroldi’s attempted coup, in fact, Powell met two high-profile Soviets. One of them was General 
Dimitri Yazov, the Soviet defense minister. The other, General Colonel Vladislav A. Achalov, 
was Powell’s former adversary, from when Powell had been serving in Germany and in 
command of V Corps. The two Soviet military leaders were in Cheney’s office, as his guests.79 
Though skeptical of how successful Gorbachev’s programs of glasnost and perestroika 
would be, Richard Cheney understood that the United States military could need to change its 
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strategy as a result. If Gorbachev did reform the Soviet Union, then the military’s focus would 
have to pivot away from being prepared “to fight an all-out global nuclear war” and toward being 
ready “to defeat anyone trying to dominate a region of the world vital to us.”80 At the time that 
these developments were occurring, Cheney was immensely distrustful of Gorbachev and that 
Soviet leader’s level of commitment to reform. However, in hindsight, Cheney observed “that 
1989 was a turning point in modern history,” because the Cold War was coming to a close.81 In 
fact, in 1989, Cheney was accompanying the Soviet Union’s General Dmitri Yazov on a tour of 
Gettysburg when he received word from Colin Powell that a coup was underway in Panama.82 
The fact that the world was changing, particularly with the coming fall of Soviet 
communism, was also apparent to James Baker. At the time that they took office, the members of 
the Bush administration understood that a lot of things were changing and that many of the 
strategic and political assumptions which had been taken for granted since the end of World War 
II would no longer be relevant. A “long-term planning paper” which Baker read explained that 
the Soviet Union was in a state of decline, with “virtually every indicator” pointing to the fact 
that “Soviet power is waning.”83 Gorbachev’s approach toward governance allowed for more 
cooperative diplomacy between the Soviets and Americans, but it also led to a new set of 
concerns. This new era of diplomatic relations allowed the United States to obtain positive 
results, such as convincing the Soviets to cut down on their support of the Sandinista 
government.84 One of the new fears was that “humiliating the Soviets as they retreated from their 
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global empire” could lead to greater resistance by the “hard-liners in Moscow.”85 Another fear 
was that “Gorbachev’s charm offensive and a diminishing Soviet military threat” could disrupt 
“West-West unity” and bring about the fragmenting of the NATO alliance.86 
Baker became especially close to Edward Shevardnadze, granting him personal insights 
into Soviet affairs. Baker’s dialogue with Shevardnadze, his Soviet counterpart, eventually 
moved away from formalities. They went beyond their official roles as “foreign ministers” to 
discuss their “private worries and thoughts.”87 In one of their open discussions, Shevardnadze 
made clear to Baker the tremendous cultural impact which political reforms were having in the 
Soviet Union. He also spoke candidly of the Soviet economy’s slow progress toward 
modernization.88 During another talk, Shevardnadze explained to Baker the problems which the 
Soviet government was having with decentralizing their system and granting more autonomy to 
the individual republics.89 These insights which Baker received from Shevardnadze were pieces 
of information which certainly reinforced his understanding that the world was going through a 
process of change. 
The decrease in the outright threat posed by the Soviet Union was apparent to George 
Bush as well. He saw Gorbachev’s reforms as creating an opening for the United States “to 
influence the situation in Eastern Europe” and “encourage liberalization.”90 The danger was in 
moving too fast and “provoking an internal crackdown” by the Soviet government.91 Bush 
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proposed to reduce the amount of American troops serving in NATO by a significant amount, in 
exchange for an equivalent gesture from the Soviets. It was only “the unanimous advice of the 
Joint Chiefs” which led him to take a more measured approach and remove ten percent of 
American combat troops in NATO, much less than his original idea of a twenty-five percent 
reduction of American troops in NATO.92 Bush clearly saw that the Soviet Union’s control of 
Eastern Europe was weakening and responded with an approach of de-escalation. 
Bush also had surprisingly close and friendly relationships with senior Soviet leaders. He 
was frequently in touch with Gorbachev, more so than his “combined predecessors did with their 
Soviet counterparts.”93 Beyond this, Bush liked Gorbachev personally. Their conversations were 
full of “Openness and candor,” and Bush believed that he “had a feel for his heartbeat.”94 The 
two of them held a “joint press conference—the first ever in US-Soviet relations,” which helped 
them to build trust and make their personal relationship even stronger.95 Later, Bush invited his 
counterpart to the White House. There, the interactions which they had led to an invitation for 
Bush to visit Moscow and an effort “to help Gorbachev’s staff modernize and streamline his 
office.”96 Encounters like these helped them to discuss the issues privately, as well as establish a 
“personal rapport.”97 Gorbachev was not the only high-ranking communist official whom Bush 
had the opportunity to interact with. He also hosted East Germany’s prime minister, who “had 
been the chairman of the Warsaw Pact meeting held only a few days before.”98 From him, Bush 
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learned that the Warsaw Pact was verging on collapse and that the Communist Party was losing 
members by the hundreds of thousands while becoming internally divided.99 
All of these leaders within the Bush administration were aware of the decline of Soviet 
power. However, none of them explained this understanding in aggressive terms. Instead, they 
emphasized opportunities for peace: reductions in troop deployments, an end to the Cold War, an 
increase in productive diplomacy, and greater familiarity with members of the high Soviet 
leadership. The prevalent themes brought up in their recollections of the Cold War’s gradual 
conclusion are far from war-like, leaving no indication that they desired a show of force or that 
these events would have encouraged them to invade a country like Panama. 
 
THE MEDIA’S ROLE 
Each of these foreign-policy leaders, except for Bush himself, made moves in their 
memoirs to deflect the claim that the media legitimized the Panama intervention or the 
administration. They made no attempt to deny that the media focused on the Panama 
intervention. Such a claim would probably not have been credible. However, by using examples 
of situations in which the media’s involvement in the invasion was negative, they implicitly 
argue that the administration did not receive support, legitimization, or any other benefits from 
the operation’s media coverage. 
Colin Powell portrayed the media’s coverage of the Panama intervention in a generally-
negative light. As planes launched from bases within the United States and headed toward 
Panama, the press reported these movements “as a show of force or a reinforcement operation,” 
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and, thanks to this misinterpretation, American forces “achieved strategic surprise.”100 Powell 
wrote that he understood “it would be hard to maintain tactical surprise” in this situation, but the 
extent to which he was blaming this on the media circulating the story is unclear.101 However, 
Powell was directly critical of what he considered to be a case of “cheap-shot journalism.”102 
After the operation, some television networks showed a “visibly upbeat” President Bush happily 
answering questions at a press conference, while “simultaneously showing on split screens” a 
scene of “the first American casualties” being unloaded from a plane.103 
Powell was especially upset by the times when the press began to interfere with how the 
operation was being conducted. At one point, the press started criticizing “The White House” for 
not destroying a particular radio tower which was continuously broadcasting pro-Noriega 
propaganda.104 Because of this, even though “the tower was not bothering us,” there were no 
nearby troops who could capture it, and “President Endara would need it in a day or so,” 
Scowcroft gave Powell the order to have it destroyed.105 This forced the American generals 
directly controlling the operation to send combat helicopters to attack “a pointless objective.”106 
At another point, some reporters became trapped in a hotel in Panama City. These 
correspondents were “in no danger,” but “bureau chiefs and network executives in New York” 
put pressure on the administration to rescue them.107 Accordingly, Scowcroft and Cheney told 
Powell to get them rescued, and Powell relayed these orders to the generals on the ground; the 
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soldiers who stormed the hotel to get the reporters out took casualties. After this incident, Powell 
told Cheney that he did not want to receive “any more such orders,” and Cheney complied with 
this request.108 
Richard Cheney had tried to control the media during the Panama intervention, but his 
efforts to do so were only partially successful. From the beginning, in considering how he would 
“handle the reporters,” his goal was to make sure that they not “interfere.”109 In particular, he 
was concerned that they would start reporting details which “could jeopardize the security of the 
operation.”110 To this end, Cheney devised “a pool system, which basically meant that certain 
reporters were selected to be on call at a given time.”111 Additionally, once in Panama, these 
reporters had their movements controlled by General Thurman, since “we couldn’t divert assets 
we needed to fight the battle to the task of escorting journalists.”112 
Cheney, like Powell, was frustrated by the consequences of some reporters hiding out in a 
hotel during the fighting. These reporters, like some others, “had gotten down to Panama on their 
own, not as part of the pool system.”113 With “their home offices in New York” pressuring “the 
White House” to rescue them, Cheney was informed that the president wanted them rescued; 
though successful, it resulted in three American soldiers being wounded and the death of a 
Spanish photographer.114 While these reporters were trapped, Cheney contended, other reporters 
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had been focusing on them, “making it seem as though the military operation, which was 
generally going well, was somehow not succeeding.”115 
James Baker downplayed the role of the media in the Panama intervention within his 
memoirs. He did mention the media’s airing of footage showing American aircraft taking off to 
assist in the invasion. Specifically, he singled out CNN for doing this and did not attribute these 
actions to any other news outlets. However, Baker appears to have believed that the footage 
being publicly aired before the operation did little or nothing to compromise its security. Without 
elaborating, Baker claimed that, in addition to CNN’s broadcasts threatening the coming 
invasion’s secrecy, “Word had finally begun leaking.”116 This would suggest that, because some 
source or sources were somehow making information about the operation known, CNN’s airing 
of information which foreshadowed an invasion was nothing new. Second, and perhaps more 
important to this point, Baker portrayed any such leaks or broadcasts as inconsequential to the 
intervention’s outcome. The operation “unfolded smoothly,” and, though there was “a fierce 
firefight at Noriega’s headquarters, the amount of resistance was less than anticipated.”117 His 
account did not provide any indication that media footage or any other sorts of leaks impacted 
the intervention in any way.118 
Baker also described some incidents similar to those mentioned by Powell and Cheney. 
The most significant of these cases was the destruction of transmitter facilities. Rather than 
something forced on the administration and the military by outside pressures, Baker presented 
the idea to destroy these places as something thought up by “my experts” as a way “to keep 
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Noriega off the airwaves.”119 The State Department apparently believed that doing so, in addition 
to securing key government buildings, would help “to restore Panamanian civilian authority as 
quickly as possible.”120 Instead of portraying himself as a major planner of these maneuvers, 
Baker portrayed himself as supporting these ideas of the State Department reluctantly. He 
strongly believed “that once a decision to commit forces is made by the commander in chief, 
civilian authorities should draw back and let the professional soldiers do their job”; by helping 
the State Department in its effort to dictate military targets, Baker argued that he was simply 
acting to quickly resolve “a bureaucratic disagreement over the priority of targets.”121 
The accounts offered by Powell and Cheney demonstrate that the media, by dictating the 
military’s targets, forcing American forces to rescue journalists, possibly compromising the 
element of surprise, and making the president look bad in at least one case, harmed the 
intervention. Meanwhile, they did not appear to offer any redeeming qualities of how the media 
presented or participated in the invasion. Bush’s memoirs offered no information on this point 
and Baker credited the State Department, rather than the media, with selecting particular targets. 
Still, even Baker neglected to mention any positive contributions by the media while mentioning 
that CNN made the operation public before it was supposed to be. These memoirs, to varying 
degrees, convey a message that the media did not play a positive or pro-administration role but 
instead damaged or could have damaged the administration’s efforts during the Panama 
intervention. 
 
 
                                                           
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
28 
 
CONNECTIONS TO THE GULF WAR 
Operation Desert Storm, or the Gulf War, is another major event which needs to be taken 
into account when considering the Bush administration’s invasion of Panama. The 
administration’s foreign-policy leaders all, in varying ways and to varying degrees, managed to 
downplay the connection between these two conflicts. This theme reinforces the point that the 
toppling of Noriega stood as an isolate incident. According to such a view, the Panama 
intervention was not part of a broader strategy or foreign policy. 
To understand how Colin Powell linked the Panama intervention with the Gulf War in his 
memoirs, one must understand what has been called the Powell Doctrine. This term, which 
“exists in no military manual” and came into popular usage as a result of Desert Storm, has the 
“decisive” use of force as its core trait.122 Rather than a definite set of rules, Powell understood 
the ideas which came to comprise this approach as overall guidelines for leaders to follow when 
making decisions. These ideas, that one should “Direct every military operation towards a clearly 
defined, decisive, and obtainable objective” and “Concentrate combat power at the decisive place 
and time,” Powell wrote, came directly from the American Army’s “Principles of War,” which 
Powell learned while in ROTC.123 
This sort of policy may have been employed in Panama and during the Gulf War, but 
Powell downplayed the degree to which these two instances were connected. Using a force of 
“more than twenty-five thousand troops,” the American military was able “to quickly eliminate 
the Panamanian forces as a threat and consolidate our position.”124 This same approach, Powell 
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explained, was used in Desert Storm to “eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait.”125 As had been done 
in Panama, the United States used tremendous force to defeat an enemy and then withdraw from 
the region with its objective completed.126 This would appear, at first glance, to establish a causal 
link between these two conflicts within Powell’s memoirs. However, Powell gave no indication 
that his experiences with the Panama intervention shaped or validated the ideas which he went 
on to employ in the Gulf War. Instead, Powell wrote that his Powell Doctrine and the guidelines 
which compromise it are derived from the teachings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. The Powell 
Doctrine, according to him, is simply a distillation of the “fundamental principles of war that go 
back thousands of years,” which “are taught as Principle of War” within the Army; Powell, 
therefore, claimed to have learned these teachings “as an ROTC cadet,” not while deposing 
Noriega.127 
While Richard Cheney did draw connections in his memoirs between the Panama 
intervention and the Gulf War, each one of these connections was either incidental enough or 
vague enough not to come with any major implications concerning the administration’s foreign 
policy. The first of these ways was related to the media. Cheney had already believed that 
“unduly negative reporting had helped sour public opinion” toward the Vietnam War, for 
example by depicting the Tet Offensive “as a devastating blow to our side, when, in fact, we 
dealt out punishing losses to the North Vietnamese.”128 The role which the media played during 
the invasion of Panama reinforced Cheney’s belief “that the press ought not be the final arbiter of 
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whether we have won or lost a war.”129 Consequently, during Desert Storm, Cheney “would try 
to be sure that we had maximum opportunity to communicate directly with the American 
people—without going through the filter of the press.”130 
The other way in which Cheney connected the operation in Panama with the Gulf War 
was a way which hardly said anything. He wrote that, while many of the high-ranking officials 
within the Bush administration, himself included, came to their “jobs with a lot of experience,” 
they lacked “experience working together as a team.”131 Events in Panama provided them with 
“real experience managing crises together,” which, Cheney wrote, was why they responded so 
well to the crisis “eight months later when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.”132 In summary, 
Cheney wrote that the Panama intervention taught him lessons in managing the media and taught 
the administration as a whole lessons in working as a team. However, his explanations of these 
matters indicate that there were only minor connections between what happened in Panama and 
what happened in the Gulf War. 
James Baker was the most direct in connecting the Panama intervention with the Gulf 
War, but even his testimony fails to establish a firm link between the two. He wrote that the 
invasion ended the reservations which many Americans had concerning “the use of force in the 
post-Vietnam era.”133 The outcome of this intervention, therefore, contributed to the 
administration’s effort “to build the public support so essential to the success of Operation Desert 
Storm.”134 Still, the administration had a difficult time rallying this support, “both in Congress 
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and with the public at large,” and Baker appears to have held that it was the “resounding 
success” of the Gulf War which ended “our country’s long and oftentimes debilitating post-
Vietnam hangover.”135 This would appear to be a claim that the national significance of the 
Panama intervention was not as great as he first made it appear; it only went some of the way in 
showing Americans that the rules of the post-Vietnam era no longer applied. 
George Bush portrayed the tie between the Panama intervention and the Gulf War as 
small at best. The Bush administration learned, while hunting Noriega, that it was difficult to 
hunt down and successfully locate a particular individual. This informed the means by which 
they would target Saddam himself: launching aerial attacks against multiple “command and 
control points where he may have been.”136 Therefore, according to Bush, the operation in 
Panama had only a minor impact on the planning of the Gulf War. 
The Bush administration’s leadership portrayed the impact of the Panama intervention on 
the Gulf War as minor. While they each acknowledge some continuity, such connections tend to 
be incidental. The connections, as presented in these memoirs, fail to suggest that the invasion of 
Panama was a major foreign-policy event for the administration. 
 
PROVOCATIONS, MEETINGS, AND THE DECISION TO INVADE 
All of these leaders addressed the issue of responsibility: who’s actions led to the 
invasion and which events prompted America’s response. In their memoirs, some of the 
administration leaders attributed a lot of influence to Powell. Additionally, all of them were in 
agreement that the final authority was that of President Bush. Each one emphasized the role 
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which two incidents of violence against Americans at the hands of Noriega’s forces played in 
bringing about the decision to go through with the Panama intervention. 
Colin Powell explained that the killing of Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz, coupled with 
the detainment and harassment of Naval Lieutenant Adam Curtis and his wife set off a series of 
communications and meetings between Powell and other American leaders. The attack which 
killed Lieutenant Paz was especially bad, as it was both “inexcusable” and representative of “an 
increasing pattern of hostility toward U.S. troops.”137 Powell conferred with Thurman and told 
military leaders in charge of transportation and special operations “to be ready to move.”138 After 
that, he went to a meeting being held at Cheney’s office. Powell and Cheney talked alone after 
everyone else had left this meeting. Asked what he thought, Powell argued that they “should 
intervene to protect American citizens,” which he saw as an acceptable action to take, given that 
Noriega was “not a legitimate leader” but rather “a criminal” who was “under indictment.”139 
After speaking with Cheney, Powell felt the need to consult with the chiefs of staff. They had a 
discreet meeting, in which Powell told them that “Paz’s killing can’t be overlooked” and that 
“Blue Spoon is a good plan”; he then asked for their views.140 While Air Force Chief of Staff 
Larry Welch had reservations and Marine Corps Commandant Al Gray had hoped that the 
Marines would be able to play a bigger role in the operation, the service chiefs came to support 
the plan unanimously.141 
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Powell described the meeting at which the Panama intervention was decided on as a 
session in which opinionated people spoke until Bush came to his decision. Cheney, Baker, 
Scowcroft, Gates, and press secretary Fitzwater were also present at that meeting, held on 
December 17. Cheney explained the situation, and Powell delivered a briefing of the plan. He 
went through their overall intentions: “eliminate Noriega and the PDF,” take temporary control 
of the country, and then hand power over once there was “a civilian government and a new 
security force.”142 He then went through the specific objectives of the various units which were 
to be deployed. Scowcroft raised concerns over the reality of casualties in such an operation and 
the possibility that Noriega could escape, “Baker believed we had an obligation to intervene,” 
and Bush asked questions. Eventually, Bush, rising from his chair, gave his approval: “Okay, 
let’s do it.”143 
Richard Cheney described the meetings which directly preceded the Panama intervention 
as being driven primarily by Colin Powell and George Bush. On December 16, Marine lieutenant 
Robert Paz was killed at a Panamanian checkpoint, and a “naval officer and his wife, witnesses 
to the shooting” of lieutenant Paz were imprisoned by Panamanian forces.144 The next day, 
Cheney called a meeting of high-ranking officials from the administration and from the United 
States military. At the meeting, “Colin Powell was particularly eloquent on the consequences” of 
the strongman’s military killing Lieutenant Paz.145 There was a sentiment at this meeting, though 
whether this was Powell’s view, Cheney’s view, or a consensus view is unclear, that such a 
killing could not “go unanswered.” Later that day, another meeting was held, this time with 
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President Bush in attendance. George Bush was briefed on the recommended course of action: 
“taking down Noriega and the PDF and restoring the democratically elected government of 
Panama.”146 Such a plan was supported “All around the room,” and it was approved by Bush’s 
order: “Do it.”147 
James Baker wrote of the events which directly led to the meeting at which the Panama 
intervention was ordered. Baker called the killing of a Marine lieutenant on December 16 by 
Panamanian forces “a tragedy that sickened me.”148 However, he noticed that this attack “had 
finally brought the military around” and that “After years of reluctance, the Pentagon was ready 
to fight.”149 On December 17, Bush “called an emergency meeting of his senior advisers” which 
“was for principals only—no staff.” 150 
Baker portrayed this meeting as largely irrelevant to Bush’s decision to intervene. There 
was “very little if any debate over the merits of invading Panama.”151 When Bush expressed his 
view, that killings like this would “go on and on,” there was no dissent; “We all agreed.”152 
Because of this, “Most of the discussion” at the meeting was about “diplomatic and logistic 
details.”153 Baker noted that Bush was concerned about the American casualties which would 
result from the operation, to which Powell responded that the situation was such that there were 
going to be American casualties in Panama with or without an invasion. The military might as 
well go on the offensive, Powell reasoned, since it would result in the same number of casualties 
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as doing nothing and allow them to capture Noriega. Though Baker “knew the President had 
already decided on his course of action,” Bush “polled his advisers.”154 Baker spoke in favor of 
intervening and echoed Powell’s reasoning. When the others were polled, “Cheney, Powell, and 
Scowcroft quickly agreed” as well.155 Then, Bush ordered the operation: “Let’s do it.”156 
George Bush wrote only a brief account of the meeting at which the decision to invade 
was declared, informing readers simply that Powell briefed him in a thorough way that calmed 
Bush’s worries and improved his confidence.157 However, he provided a more detailed account 
of his decision-making process. On December 17, Bush wrote that “Last night a young Marine 
was killed in Panama,” elaborating on how he and the other Marines had been shot at by 
Panamanians while they themselves were unarmed.158 “Shortly after that a Navy lieutenant and 
his wife were taken in by the same check point people and harassed for 30 minutes,” and “A day 
or so before” all of this, Panama had declared war on the United States while naming “Manuel 
Noriega as the maximum leader.”159 These events led him to “put into forward motion a major 
use of force to get Noriega out”; he made no mention of any military briefings or input he had 
received from his advisors.160 Bush recognized that the operation was “a major gamble,” knew 
that “World opinion will be difficult,” suspected that “the Soviet reaction will probably be 
negative,” and was sure that “some of the Central Americans will be very wary.”161 
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Above all other things, the potential for American casualties weighed on Bush. The “Loss 
of American life” was a concern on his mind the day that he gave the order to intervene.162 
During the hours leading up to the invasion itself, Bush thought a lot about “those young 19 year 
olds who will be dropped in tonight” and found it impossible to sleep, since “the lives of 
American kids are at risk.”163 Later, after Noriega had taken shelter in “the Vatican Embassy in 
Panama,” Bush suggested that he would not be willing to drop the indictments, since the offer to 
allow Noriega to leave peacefully had been made “before we lost American lives.”164 
The administration’s foreign-policy leaders provided accounts which contradict each 
other at times. However, they were generally in agreement concerning the most important events 
in the leadup to Bush’s decision to order the operation. All of them depicted Bush as having the 
greatest influence and final authority, with all of them but Baker emphasizing Powell’s role in 
the decision-making process. They all placed significant emphasis on the attacks which provoked 
the American response. Perhaps consistent with this, Bush appears to have been extremely 
concerned with the possibility that Americans could be killed during the intervention, making 
clear that he was heavily invested in the defense of American lives. 
 
HOW THEY JUSTIFIED THE PANAMA INTERVENTION 
The foreign-policy leaders within the Bush administration demonstrated a consensus 
when writing explicitly about the motives behind the Panama intervention. Their collective 
explanation was that the operation was carried out to defend Americans and spread democracy to 
Panama. While these four officials wrote about the invasion’s justifications in various ways, all 
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of them highlighted these motives while downplaying or ignoring other potential motives. As a 
result, the image of an invasion driven by concerns of self-defense and promoting democracy 
emerges from these accounts, which are often confusing and disjointed. 
Colin Powell provides many reasons for the Panama intervention in his memoirs, but, 
overall, he appears to stress democracy. At one point, he listed the many justifications which the 
United States could have invoked: “Noriega’s contempt for democracy, his drug trafficking and 
indictment, the death of the American Marine, the threat to our treaty rights to the canal.”165 At 
earlier points in that memoir, he told Cheney that “we should intervene to protect American 
citizens” and told the service chiefs that “Paz’s killing can’t be overlooked.”166 While Powell 
undoubtedly presented these as strong reasons to intervene, he mostly focused on the cause of 
bringing democracy to the Panamanian people. 
Much earlier in his story, Powell mentioned Noriega as an obstacle to Latin American 
democracy, framing him from the beginning as a threat defined by its opposition to democratic 
goals.167 The democratic case against Noriega became stronger as Powell discussed the aftermath 
of the operation. When going through the losses incurred by the invasion and some of the 
operation’s shortcomings, Powell wrote that “Twenty-four Americans gave their lives in Panama 
to achieve this victory for democracy,” which seems to hold up the restoration of Panamanian 
democracy as the primary goal which was achieved.168 Looking back on the intervention about 
six years after it had occurred, Powell wrote of its success, pointing to two things: Noriega’s 
state as a convicted and imprisoned man and Panama’s status of having “a new security force” 
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and being “a democracy, with one free election to its credit.”169 In a different memoir, writing 
about twenty years after the intervention, Powell provided evidence for its success by 
highlighting the current absence of American troops in the country and the fact that “the 
Panamanians have held four democratic elections.”170 The reoccurring theme in these passages is 
the invasion being a success because it was a victory for democracy, which, whether he intended 
this or not, causes Powell’s memoirs to suggest that bringing democracy was the primary motive 
for the Panama intervention. 
It is important to note that Richard Cheney portrayed his views on authority in foreign-
policy decision-making as nuanced. He saw the Iran-Contra affair as part of the struggle between 
Congress and the executive branch over such control of foreign policy. Though he apparently 
believed that Reagan truly did not know of this plot and though he was “critical of the 
administration’s conduct,” Cheney felt that it was important “to defend the presidency itself 
against congressional attempts to encroach on its power.”171 However, due to the lack of 
interservice coordination which Cheney saw during the American invasion of Grenada, he 
supported the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Despite 
the fact that Reagan’s “administration was less than enthusiastic about the legislation,” Cheney 
believed that “Congress had properly asserted itself” in that latter case.172 Rather than as a strict 
adherent to a doctrine of centralized power, Cheney depicted himself as someone in favor of 
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keeping the branches of government in balance with one another, especially in matters relating to 
foreign policy. 
Richard Cheney did not provide a single or definitive reason for the Panama intervention 
in his memoirs, making his exact stance on this matter unclear. Initially, when introducing 
Manuel Noriega to the reader, he wrote that “The Panama Canal was a strategic asset” and 
suggested that Noriega posed a threat to it.173 He also wrote that “there were American lives at 
stake,”: more specifically, the lives of the “twelve thousand American troops stationed in 
Panama.”174 Finally, he asserted that “our country’s patience was running thin,” which, having 
been written after a description of Noriega’s drug-trafficking activities, his “indictment by 
federal grand juries in Florida,” and his suppression of a democratic election, suggests that these 
were also reasons that the United States wanted Noriega to be removed from power.175 
Later, after the shooting of Lieutenant Paz, the idea of an intervention became a matter of 
punishing Noriega’s military, either to avenge Paz, to demonstrate American retaliatory power, 
or both; the precise reasoning here is ambiguous.176 Finally, Cheney wrote about visiting 
American servicemembers in Panama after the intervention. There, he praised the troops for 
defending the democracy of the Panamanian people.177 In summary, he presents the defense of 
the Panama Canal, the safeguarding of American lives, the halting of Noriega’s illicit activities, 
and the protection of Panamanian democracy as reasons for the Panama intervention; 
additionally, he may have been motivated to avenge the killing of Lieutenant Paz, showcase 
America’s military power, or both. Cheney offered many justifications for the invasion without 
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specifying one as more important than the others and often neglecting to present the reader with 
his exact reasoning. 
James Baker offered multiple initial reasons for wanting to depose Noriega, and they 
were consistent with his stated beliefs. Baker suspected that Noriega was a threat requiring a 
forceful removal from the beginning of his time as secretary of state. He offered several reasons 
for this. Noriega was deeply involved in the international drug trade and his military was 
carrying out escalating “assaults” on “American servicemen and their families stationed in 
Panama.”178 Meanwhile, his rule “threatened the transfer of the canal to Panamanian 
sovereignty,” in addition to America’s ability to protect the canal, while also hampering “our 
effort both to promote democracy in the hemisphere and to combat narcotics trafficking.”179 Of 
these various provocations and perceived threats, Baker considered the “first and foremost” issue 
to be the threat posed be Noriega “to the lives and well-being of the 40,000 American 
servicemen and civilians living in Panama.”180 
Later, Baker discussed the exact ways in which the Panama intervention was justified in 
principle. He wrote that it was “an exercise in supporting democracy and the rule of law in the 
hemisphere.”181 On one hand, “Noriega was a dictator who had stolen an election.”182 His rule 
was one which “thwarted the will of the Panamanian people,” and the United States, by 
intervening and putting the democratically-elected government in power, “was simply enforcing 
the will of the Panamanians.”183 The operation was, according to Baker, also justified on the 
                                                           
178 James A. Baker, III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, 
War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 177. 
179 Ibid., 178. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid., 193. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid., 193-194. 
41 
 
grounds of self-defense. Noriega had already “started killing American servicemen,” and the 
administration refused to allow something like that to happen again.184 The last of Baker’s 
justifications based on principle was the claim that the intervention was in line with “the time-
honored admonition of the national anthem, whose little-noticed fourth stanza exhorts us to 
conquer ‘when our cause it is just. . . .’ ”185 
Along similar lines, Baker’s views on presidential war powers should also be noted. 
Baker believed, as he explained in the context of the leadup to the Gulf War, that the 
Constitution “is unassailable” on the point that authority in matters of foreign policy “is 
preeminent in the executive.”186 This meant to him, in effect, “that the president didn’t legally 
need to have congressional approval when ordering troops into combat.”187 The only reason that 
Baker supported obtaining congressional support for the Gulf War was the potential for that 
conflict, unlike those in Grenada and Panama, to have “significant casualties.”188 
Baker also presented multiple benefits which came from the Panama intervention. First, 
Baker wrote, President Bush’s “resolve in Panama was a tonic” which encouraged the 
government of Colombia “to stand up to” a cartel which had assassinated three presidential 
candidates.189 He also asserted that the intervention deterred the Sandinista government from 
stealing an election “and strengthened the resolve of Nicaraguan citizens to stand up and be 
counted on their election day.”190 Another bold claim of Baker’s was that the invasion had such a 
great affect that it “was directly responsible for the historic Santiago declaration,” which 
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committed nations within the Western Hemisphere “to collective action anywhere democracy 
was threatened in the region.”191 Lastly, it played at least some role in ending the anti-
interventionist sentiment among Americans and, consequently, facilitated the county’s 
participation in the Gulf War to a certain degree. While Baker presents all of these occurrences 
as benefits, and therefore could be said to be offering justifications in hindsight, he insisted that 
these effects were not planned out when the decision was made to intervene. Rather, that choice 
“flowed from a single event: the President’s determination that a naked assault on democracy 
wouldn’t be tolerated.”192 
While George Bush listed several events which may have been reasons for the Panama 
intervention, he did not explicitly designate them as such reasons, at least not initially. He wrote 
about the killing of “a young Marine,” about the detainment and harassment of “a Navy 
lieutenant and his wife,” and that “the Panamanians declared war on the United States,” as well 
as “installed Manuel Noriega as the maximum leader.”193 While these events were all clearly 
negative, why exactly they justified an invasion was not explicitly stated. It may have been to 
exact revenge, to topple a government nominally at war with America as a show of force, to 
remove a potential threat to the United States, or some other reason entirely; since Bush does not 
adequately explain his logic or precisely describe his reasoning here, one can only guess at this 
point what exact motive or motives this entry was meant to convey at this stage.194 
Interestingly, there is no initial mention of wanting to spread democracy or free the 
people of Panama from Noriega. In fact, by describing the people who killed the American 
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Marine as “Panamanians” rather than members of Noriega’s military, attributing the declaration 
of war to “the Panamanians,” and saying that these same “Panamanians” were the ones who 
“installed Manuel Noriega as the maximum leader,” Bush’s writing conflated the people of 
Panama with Noriega.195 This severe conflation is partially undone in a subsequent footnote 
which explains that Guillermo Endara and Guillermo Ford had been elected as president and vice 
president, respectively, “back in May, but Noriega had overturned the election results.”196 Still, 
the degree to which Panamanians opposed the Noriega regime was never touched on besides that 
brief point. And, hours before the operation, Bush wrote about having Endara and Ford instated 
as the new leaders of Panama as an uncertain possibility, while he wrote about the impending 
invasion as a certainty; putting the democratically-elected government in power seems to have 
been an afterthought or a secondary goal at best.197 
It is only later, in a letter sent to Mexico’ president on February 3, 1990, that Bush’s 
depiction of his motives for the Panama intervention changed. In this letter, while trying to 
justify the invasion, Bush claimed that he “had to protect American life,” suggesting, in 
hindsight, that this was his ultimate motive. He also directly justified the invasion with 
democracy by writing “that the Panamanian people supported our action by over 92% at one 
point” and mentioning his happiness “that Democracy has a chance now—a real chance there in 
Panama.”198 As a result, through this letter, Bush’s reasoning changed from unfocused and 
indirect to focused and direct in his drive to protect Americans with the operation, while bringing 
democracy to Panama changed from being an incidental result to being an essential justification. 
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These explanations were echoed in another of Bush’s writing which he produced some time after 
the letter to Mexico’s president. In this later reflection, he described the invasion of Panama as 
an “operation to save American lives, bring Noriega to justice, and restore Panamanian 
democracy.”199 
Bush was clear in stating, through the collected writings which he published, that he did 
not order the Panama intervention because it was popular. Rather, his writings cast it as an 
important but unpopular move. Writing shortly after ordering the invasion, he mentioned how 
countries around the world, particularly the Soviet Union and some countries in Central 
America, would probably react negatively.200 The letter which he wrote to the president of 
Mexico on February 3, 1990 showed him to have been at least partially correct on this point, 
since he acknowledged that the Panama intervention “has caused some heartburn in Mexico.”201 
And, when reflecting on the widespread belief that “I live by the polls and want to be popular,” 
he wrote about how “Panama might not have gone down well,” in terms of popularity.202 Still, 
Bush wrote, “you’ve got to do what you think is right, take the heat, and that’s what I’m trying to 
do.”203 
President Bush and his top foreign-policy officials wrote testimonies which had varying 
degrees of precision but which indicated the same core motives for the Panama intervention. 
These leaders showed that they were capable, in many cases, of being incredibly vague. In other 
situations, their messages were clear, direct, and unmistakable. These written testimonies join 
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together in stressing two common themes: protecting the lives of Americans and establishing a 
democratic government in Panama. Other possible motives were either left unaddressed, 
addressed only briefly, or referred to only ambiguously. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In their recollections of the Panama intervention, the senior foreign-policy leaders of 
George Bush’s administration, including President Bush himself, continuously pressed home a 
single point. This was the argument that the invasion which deposed Manuel Noriega was not 
motivated by other occurrences around the world or by the administration’s foreign-policy 
strategy. According to their accounts, the operation was motivated entirely, or at least almost 
entirely, by idealist aims. The invasion, according to them, was not carried out for political or 
strategic gain, and any such gains which arose from it were mostly or entirely incidental. 
The first major way in which they expressed this was through an implicit negative 
argument. Their memoirs, though they each noted the fall of the Soviet Union and its decline as 
an international military power, gave no indication that the receding of Soviet influence gave the 
administration any reason to demonstrate its power by toppling Panama’s government. By 
portraying the American media as a force which hindered the operation, their memoirs appear to 
refute any claims that the invasion was ordered for the purpose of receiving positive news 
coverage which boosted Bush’s image. The repeated downplaying of the connection between the 
Panama intervention and the Gulf War, which one can repeatedly see in these memoirs, suggests 
that any claims that paint the former as the administration’s preparation for the latter are false. 
These three lines of argumentation imply that, whatever happened in Panama, it was not done for 
the sake of obtaining a better political image or securing a strategic advantage. 
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The second way in which the Bush administration’s memoirs paint the Panama 
intervention as an idealist venture is through an explicit positive argument. Their descriptions of 
the final provocations which led to the invasion, the process of making the decision to invade, 
and the various principles used to justify it serve this purpose. At many points, the memoirs 
prevent a reader from pinning down exactly what their authors’ arguments were by being vague 
and often unclear about what claims, exactly, were supposed to be made. At other times, they 
defer responsibility onto other members of the administration. When, however, the writers did 
take clear and positive stands, it was always to repeatedly emphasize one of several explicit 
points: that Americans in Panama were in danger, that Noriega was a tyrant who had to be 
removed, that democracy had to be spread, or that America was acting in self-defense. These, as 
perhaps the only clear statements concerning the administration’s motivation for the invasion, 
serve as the explicit administration line, arguing that idealist causes were what drove the ultimate 
decision. 
Such a depiction of the Panama intervention is certainly controversial. Many of the 
sources cited in this project’s review of secondary literature are contradicted by the narrative 
backed by the administration. However, an investigation of the degree to which Bush and his 
fellow foreign-policy leaders told the truth or failed to do so is beyond the scope of this project. 
It has sought to understand how these individuals, in their memoirs, fit the Panama intervention 
into the Bush administration’s overall foreign-policy strategy and found that they separated it out 
from other matters of foreign policy and domestic politics, presenting it as an act which was 
executed for the sake of idealist and humanitarian concerns, rather than political and strategic 
ones. Additional research would be necessary to attempt to determine whether they were honest 
memoirists or cynical manipulators of public opinion. 
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